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The difficult task we have set for ourselves in this paper is to 
attempt to illuminate the relationship among science, technology and 
development, using the experience of seven countries of widely differ­
ent characteristics and operating at different.stages of development 
as building blocks. 1 the issues to be addressed are inherently com­
plicated. Relevant theory is, by general consensus, still in its 
infancy and modest step-by-step empirical approaches consequently 
cannot help us very much. This is also an area of major discontinuities 
in behavior, always more difficult for scientists to handle, and one 
in which the temptation to perceive all dimensions of human progress 
as relevant is both natural and bound to lead us in too many directions 
at once. 
Nevertheless, the effort should be made--not only to attempt to 
improve our basic understanding of how we got here, and why, but also 
because the distillation of such an improved understanding may hold 
some lessons for the future, especially with respect to the achievement 
of modern growth on the part of contemporary developing countries. 
*The author wishes to ~cknowledge the assistance of H.T.C. Hu and 
the comments of Bill Beranek. 
~ile in this sense this paper attempts, inter alia, to "synthesize" 
the work of others, they are not to be held responsible for the inter­
pretations made, conclusions drawn, and errors committed here. 
**This is a revised version of a paper presented at the National 
Academy of Sciences Bicentennial Symposium on "Science: A Resource for 
Humankind," September, 1976. 
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The problems and aspirations of that two-thirds of humanity which does 
not yet enjoy modern growth, but is anxious to achieve it~-while deeply 
puzzled as to the proper role of science and technology--represent our 
main concern. 
The very nature of this effort, necessarily eclectic and tour 
d'ho:rizon in character, means that we should not ·expect to find a new, 
definitive set of answers to these old and perplexing problems. It 
also means that the temptation to force observations into c·onsistency 
with some premature unifying theme or preconceived theoretical mold 
must be resisted. All 'we can and have tried to do is, by selectively 
organizing the information arid insights gathered by all the participants, 
to improve soinewhat our understanding of these complicated inter­
relationships and ·point the direction 'which further, original andmore 
basic, ~alysis might well talce. If, in spite of ourselves, we seem 
at times to have reached out in search of some broader explanatory 
framework, it is with.the understanding that the improvement, or even 
the reasoned rejection of such a _framework, by others, will serve to 
advance the common cause. 
. . 
Tlie'approach of this paper is frankly historical, focussing mainly 
. 
on the 18th and.19th century experience of the.now advanced and the 
more recent experience of the currently developing countries. This is 
because we believe that history indeed represents the most important 
and as yet most underutilized laboratory for the exploration of these 
issues. 
We recognize, moreover, at this most general level, that while 
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all societies, historical and contemporary, share the tyranny of their 
initial endowments,they face substantial alternatives with respect to 
their objectives and the way in which they decide to organize themselves. 
To keep the scope of this paper from becoming entirely unmanageable, we 
shall not concern ourselves very much with a comparative evaluation of 
organizational systems. We shall assume, especially when dealing with 
contemporary developing countries, that they are of the mixed, non­
socialist variety. Moreover, and not unrelated, we shall not be concerned 
with possible inter-country differences in social objectives. Instead, 
we shall assume that all societies may be located on some more or less 
continuous spectrum of institutional choice and that the "old-fashioned" 
development objective, sustained increases in per capita income, 
either is shared by all, or, and more s~tisfactory, is not in necessary 
conflict with such other valid non-traditional concerns as distribution 
and employment. 
In order to avoid a veritable parade of definitions, we shall equate 
"social and economic development" ~th per capita income growth; by 
"science" we shall mean the accumulation of basic systematic knowledge 
about the natural universe around us; and by "technology",the application 
of such knowledge to the construction of a pool of ideas useful in the 
production of goods and services. Neither with respect to science or 
technology will we entertain the plausible notion that such activities 
may represent some sort of valid type of art form carrying its own 
cultural, esthetic or consumption values. While we recognize that the 
relationships among "science," "technology" and "development" as defined 
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here may be indirect, lagged, multidimensional, uncertain and, above all, 
complicated, it is these relationships we shall be mainly concerned with. 
Our country sample includes Great Britain, the acknowledged historical 
leader in the transition to modern growth; Germany and the United States, 
two early followers; Japan and Hungary, two relatively late followers; 
and, finally, Brazil and Ghana, two contemporary developing economies. 
We will first (Section II) try to define more precisely the issues 
on which this set of papers 1s attempting to shed some light. We will 
then review the relevant evidence from the historical experience of the 
now mature early developers (Section III), of the late followers 
(Section IV) and of the currently developing economies (Section V). Our 
findings and conclusions are summarized in(Section VI). 
II. Some of the Issues 
Most scientists, whether natural or social, and most officials, 
whether from developed (DC) or less developed (LDC) cowitries,share 
the general conviction tnat there· indeed exist strong relationships 
among the three variables, science, technology and development, with 
which we are concerned. There is, however, considerably less under­
standing, hence agreement, on the precise nature of these relation­
ships or even on the direction of the causal order. Consequently, 
with underlying behavior not well understood, it is natural that there 
should exist a good deal of uncertainty with respect to what constitutes 
appropriate government policy in support of a society's basic develop­
mental objective. 
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The·relatively "easier" part of the puzzle is undoubtedly that 
which focusses on the relationship between technology and development. 
A substantial amount of work, both theoretical and empirical, has been 
done in this area, mainly by economists. This work has permitted us 
to conclude fairly unambiguously that the association between technology 
and growth is indeed strong, i.e., that it is changes in the quality 
of a society's processes and goods which are highly associated with 
economic growth. The precise character of the technological change 
associated with growth remains a ''measure of our· igno.rance"; we do not 
know whether it is manna from heaven (what the economists call "disem­
bodied" and "exogenous") or whether it results from R & D embodied in 
people or machines. The increased physical availability and applica­
tion of homogeneous factors, i.e., "more of the same", in the absence 
of technology change, probably accounts for only a small portion, perhaps 
as little as 20%, of total growth in most of the advanced non--socialist 
countries. As Kuznets puts it, even when we acknowledge that new tech­
nology may have negative as well as positive impacts on society--including 
additional social costs and discomforts--"the nettest definition•••would 
still show a rapid increase [of income] per head, against fewer working 
hours. 112 
Most aggregative studies--a la Solow, Kendrick and Denison--assign 
the label "technology change" to everything which cannot be explained 
via an augmentation of enwnerated physical inputs. However, the strength 
of particular micro-associations and the all-important "richer" issue 
2 .S. Kuznets, "Technological Innovations and Economic Growth," p. 30,
to be published, M. Kranzberg, editor. 
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of what causes technology change endogenously brings us, even here, onto 
shakier ground. Cross-country studies trying to relate expenditures on 
R & .D (as a percent of GNP) to growth in productivity, for example by 
the OECD, have come up empty. 3 It is just as likely that the major causal 
chain is reversed: More growth, hence affluence, may simple permit more 
R & D to be carried out. In other words, while we are fairly sure about 
the causal i~portance of technology change for growth, we do not as yet. 
understand the anatomy of technology change well enough t~ know how to, 
affect its strength or character with any degree of precision. 
A large part of this problem is that our understanding of the rela­
tionship between science and the other two members of our basic triplet 
is even more precarious--especially as far. as .· the LDC' s are concerned. 
What we do have is an act of faith on the part of some that science must 
precede technology, which causes growth. Others see relatively little 
evidence of~ necessary causal relationship between science and technology, 
at least for any given country, and, rather, view science as something 
,only rich countries should be able to afford,whil~ poor ones borrow. 
Such extreme points of view naturally lead to equally extreme positions 
as t~ policy. On one side are those who would advise LDC's,for example, 
to acquire and maintain frontier capacity in every major field of science 
in order to be able to participate fully in the benefits of technology 
change. On the other are those who would counsel LDC's to let the DC's 
spen.d their relatively ample resources, on basic sci.ence, and then pick 
and choose only "appropriate" areas of .science, if necessary, along with 
3 
see The Conditions. for Success in Technological Innovation, OECD, 
Paris, 1974. 
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only "appropriate" types of technology, if possible, from the "free" 
international shelf of human knowledge. Undoubtedly, the truth lies 
somewhere in between. 
Thirdly, the notion of "appropriateness" itself, whether with re­
spect to science or technology, if it has validity, must be relatable 
to national endowments or capacities, even if these are interpreted from 
a dynamic and long-term perspective. Just as the product cycle, for 
example, seems to hold certain useful notions as to the path of product 
and technology mixes across countries at different levels of development, 
is there a valid analogy in science? Do different resource endowments 
really induce different types or directions, as opposed to simply 
different quantitites, of technology change? Again, is anything analo­
gous]yvalid in the field of science? 
Fourthly, and closely related to what has gone before, of course, 
is the issue of the potential role of government in strengthening both 
the links between technology and growth and between science and tech­
nology. This, of course, depends in large part on the illumination of 
the basic behavioral relationships which will hopefully result from 
our effort at rummaging through the various available historical labora­
tories, particularly with respect to such issues as the relative appro­
priability or inappropriability of new scientific and/or technological 
know-how and its relation to the perfection or imperfection of goods and 
information markets. 
Finally--and "finally" only_ because we must necessarily exercise 
some self-restraint with respect to the number of difficult issues we 
can even touch upon within the confines of this paper~-is the question 
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of whether, whatever relationships existed between science, technology 
and development in the 18th and 19th c~nturies, these relationships 
have become fundamentally altered in character in the 20th. Here 
there are at least two major viewpoints in evidence in the literature: 
one,that technology used to be empirically based but is now science­
based; the other, that technology has always been, and continues to 
be, science-based, except that science is now "bigger" and the gap 
between it and technology smaller. 
III. The Early Developers: Great Britain, Germany and the United States 
It is generally accepted that Great Britain was the world's leader 
in both technology and growth in the 18th and early 19th centuries, 
followed, in the first instance, by France and Germany on the Continent, 
and then by the United States in the "overseas territories." There 
appears to be substantial agreement as to the factors to which Great 
Britain owed her original position of preeminence, but less on why it 
failed to persist, and least on the relationship all of this had, if 
any, to the role of science. 
The so-called Industrial Revolution, associated with the substi­
tution of machines and inanimate power for labor power came first to 
Great Britain. This is frequently atttibuted,4 among other factors, 
to her relatively higher level and better distribution of income, 
hence broader base of purchasing power; her favorable geographic 
position associated with both greater immunity from war and greater 
4 . 
. E.g. , see David S. Landes; The Utibciutid Prometheus, C~bridge
University Press, 1972. · 
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access to less troublesome trading partners; her relatively better 
endowment in natural resources, especially coal; but, most of all, 
her relatively greater progress in throwing off internal feudalistic 
and mercantilist interferences. Thus, while all of Western Europe 
was undergoing significant long-term change associated with urbani­
zation, nationalism and the generally enhanced application of reason 
to assist man to better manipulate his environment, Great Britain 
emerged with a clear lead in textiles, as well as in the machinery 
industry to which impovements in textiles gave rise, until the middle 
of the 19th century. 
Yet, in spite of all efforts to keep advances in technology 
"bottled up" on the British islands--by prohibiting the export of 
workers before 1825 and of machinery before 1842--by the time 
of the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851 there were clear indications 
that the Continent, especially Germany, was taking the lead in the 
important chemical, pharmaceutical and electrical engineering indus­
tries, with the United States :forging ahead in mechanical engineering. 
By the time of World War I, as Cardwell points out, Britain had become 
an importer of skilled labor and technology. Explaining the more 
controversial "why" of this change in leadership position in techno,1.ogy 
and growth is interesting not only for its own sake but also because 
it may help us to understand better their mutual relationship to 
science. 
Cardwell attributes the decline of British leadership largely to 
the fact that British technology was substantially "empirically-based" 
-10-
rather than "science-based." Such a distinction between technology 
which arises from trial and error manipulations of the environment 
rather than from c;.1-janges in our basic comprehension of the laws 
governing that environment is also made by Rosenberg and others. The 
British early lead, according to this.view, was based on such industries 
as textiles, metals and brewing which developed on the basis of 
"tinkering" rather than new scientific insights. Even the smelting 
of iron ore was presumably carried out without knowledge of the 
chemistry of oxidation or reduction. 
According to this view, one of the principal reasons for Britain's 
later relative decline is the fact that empirically-based technology 
change--:even if sustained for a time by sequential or "neighboring" 
problem-solving innovations 5--ultimately is not sustainable, if 
·not replenished by basic scientific advances. Cardwell sees British 
science in a long post-Newtonian decline, with pronounced neglect of 
scientific education, at the very time .the ,country is leading in steam 
power, textiles, an~ metallurgy. At. the same time the Empire is 
sipho~ing off energies and capit&Land Briti~h entrepreneurs are 
becoming. "fat" and more interested in the gentlemanly life than the 
improvement of their mills and factories. When, this is placed in.· 
~he context of an incre;:isingly strong nationalistic response to the 
"British challenge," on the Continent, in the form of greater emphasis 
on science and on science-based education, the loss of leadership in 
"science-based" i,ndustries to France and, especially, to Germany, can 
5As so thoroughly documented by A.P. Usler The History of 
Mechanical Inventions, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Go., Inc., 1929). 
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be explained. The French Ecole Polytechnique had no equivalent in 
BI'itain, while the somewhat more pragmatically oriented post-Liebig 
research labs and engineering schools helped Germany to outdistance 
everyone in the chemical/pharmaceutical, iron and steel and electrical 
machinery industries by the end of the 19th century. 
An explanation of Britain's relative decline based heavily on her 
failure to perceive the existence of a direct causal link between 
basic science and technology does not, however, se?'ve us very well when 
we examine the relative success of the U.S. experience beginning in 
the last half of the 19th century. The base for U.S. technology 
change and its associated growth pattern was clearly "empirical" as 
well, in the sense that the U.S. exploitation of the idea of mass pro­
duction with interchangeable parts,which gave it a commanding lead in 
the mechanical engineering industries,can also be said to have emerged 
from trial and error on top of largely imported technology. Rosenberg 
sees the Americans borrowing "freel.y and extensively from Europe," 
with very little "genuinely inyentive activity" in evidence during the 
colonial period. There was little government support of science. Be­
ginning around 1850, nevertheless, the U.S. began to innovate .mean"'." 
ingfully in the area of production engineering and the application of 
improved mechanical skills; the McCormack reaper, the Colt .45,. the 
cotton gin and the typewriter were among the products which revolutionized 
in a rather fundamental way factory production methods generally. 
While putting out and handicraft production persisted in Europe, the 
U. S., as Cardwell and Rosenberg agree, quickly became the tmdisputed 
leader in industries which lent themselves to the introduction of 
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labor-saving machinery for the mass production of a standardized 
product. Before World War I, Singer Sewing established a subsidiary 
outside Glasgow said to be the "most advanced" in Britain, if not 
in Europe. None of the industries in which the U. S. began to set the 
innovative pace can be said to be "science- based," certainly not 
in contrast with the industries in which Germany assumed the lead. 
A somewhat different explanation of why Britain's leadership 
role was gradually eclipsed may simultaneously provide us with an 
approach to a better µnderstanding of the relationship between 
science, technology and growth. This explanation would essentially 
start by rejecting the notion that any sustained technology change 
can really be "empirically-based" as opposed to "science-based." 
There clearly exist marked, and important, differences in the direct­
ness of the link, from either the physical or temporal points of view. 
But we find it difficult to accept the notion that British technological 
advances. in textiles and metallurgy were not firmly based on steam 
power or that the steam engine.in turn. was not based on prior basic 
advances in man's understanding of physics. 6 Even if Watt's steam 
engine can be relegated (as Cardwell does) to the realm of an 
"isolated exception"--which we doubt--it is a most important one. 
And there were others. For technology change to occur, something 
has tobe "in the air" in the form of recent, or past, improvements 
in our basic understanding of the universe-~even if the innovator 
himself is not a scientist working in a laboratory. Arkwright's 
6
First pointed out to me by Simon Kuznets in private correspondence. 
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water frame (1769) is viewed as "wholly barren of science" by 
Cardwell, yet the fact that h~ was previously an apprentice to a 
barber and a wigmaker does not mean the invention was not based on 
previously acquired science. As Cardwell puts it, "if [such innova­
tions] have scientific content••• it is so well known that it can be 
taken as common knowledge." But that is just the point. Just because 
the idea utilized has not recently sprung from the garret or the 
research lab of some scientist does not make it any less science-based. 
This is, of course, not to say that we cannot, or indeed should 
not, distinguish between relatively major or epochal types of tech-
nology change and relatively minor, successor (or adaptive) types. 7 
The former may be more obviously and directly science-related, e.g. , 
a new hybrid seed and Mendelian laws,or plastics and molecular 
chemistry; but the new combinations of fertilizer and water required 
to render the new seeds most effective, and the new industrial appli­
cations of plastic materials, are surely just as much related to 
science as the initial major technical advance. 
Closely related to this question, and thus perhaps shedding 
additional light on it, is the possibility of a "reverse" causal 
ordering, running from technology change to scientific progress. As 
both Banal and Kuznets have pointed out, 8 science is likely to be 
stimulated by new data, new tools and new "puzzles" which emerge in 
the course of the application and modification of technology. Thus, 
7cardwell himself contrasts "revolutionary inventions and evolu­
tionary improvements." 
8S. Kuznets, op. cit. 
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the original smelting of iron may have (as already mentioned) proceeded 
without full understanding of the chemistry of oxidation or reduction. 
Yet the fact that the Bessemer process initially worked in England 
but not on the Continent (where the iron ore had a higher phosphorus 
content) led to new scientific inquiries into basic metallurgy and, 
in turn, to the improved Thomas-Gilchrist steel-making process. 
Similarly, the difficulties encountered in the transplanting of 
improved seeds from one country to another have led to substantial 
new breakthroughs in agricultural chemistry. 
It may therefore be useful to think of science and technology as 
more of a closed mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent circle-­
and for both scientific and technological advances to be viewed as 
moving points on a spectrum, some indicating major cataclysmic or 
epochal "jumps," others less spectacular advances in understanding 
and accomplishment. Does such a notion almost serve to obliterate 
the difference between the concepts of "science" and "technology"? 
We do not think so; the definitions previously adopted stand up rather 
well. What it does do is cast doubt on the usefulness of the distinc­
tion between ·11 science-based" and "empirically-based" technology change. 
It might perhaps be more useful to speak rather in terms of "science­
intehsive" versus "engineering-intensive" technology change along 
that spectrum. This might help us to distinguish between what was 
happening during the last half of the nineteenth century in the 
chemical/pharmaceutical industries of Germany and in a number of the 
interchangeable parts/machine technology dominated industries in the 
United States. 
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But where does this leave us with respect to our search for an 
"explanation" of why Britain lost her lead in the "science-intensive" 
industries to Germany and her lead in the "engineering-intensive" 
industries to the u. S.? It is perhaps more useful to seek such an 
explanation in the realm of the changing impact of differences in the 
endowment and in public policy over time. 
Britain's early leadership position w~s, as we have already noted, 
closely tied to her relatively abundant natural resources, in particular 
coal and iron ore, as well as to the relatively more pronounced 
laissez faire position of her government--guaranteeing not only non­
intervention at home but market access abroad. It is plausible to 
argue that some of these advantages turned to disadvantages later on. 
Let us begin with natural resources. There is little doubt that 
Britain's advantage in coal, iron and geography heavily contributed 
to the smugness and loss of entrepreneurial energy previously noted. 
But it also meant that the Continent, especially Germany, felt under 
great pressure to catch up. Even after the exploitation of the Ruhr's 
. coal deposits began in earnest, fuel costs remained higher on the Con­
tinent. The same was true for iron ore. Consequently,"continental 
irorunasters were making more of their resources than their competitors 
across the Channel; and since fuel economy was the key to efficiency 
in almost every stage of manufacture, the tentative advances of the 
1830's and 1840's were the starting point of. a scientific metallurgy 
9that was to pay off in major improvements a generation later." There 
can be little doubt that Germany's spectacular success in the science-
9
D. S. Landes, op. cit., p. 181. 
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intensive chemical industry was very much related to a strong national­
istic drive aimed at finding substitutes for her deficiencies in natural 
resources at home and colonies abroad. 
With respect to the United States, that country could increasingly 
take advantage of her relatively much more abundant wood supply to man­
ufacture lighter textile and other machinery. Such machinery was first 
considered an amusing oddity, but later generally recognized as techni­
cally superior. The relative abundance of her natural resources base 
also gave her the continuing advantage of a cheaper supply of fuel, 
first based on steam, then, built on the scientific advances made else­
where in the field of induction, on electric power. Moreover, her 
labor shortage removed most institutional (e.g., Luddite), as well as 
economic, obstacles to a thorough-going exploitation of labor-saving 
technological opportunities. From textiles to metallurgy and to the 
many later applications of machine-making in routinized mass production 
industries, the response to changes in the environment was usually 
rapid. Rosenberg points out that as the comparative advantage in 
cheap wood later dwindled, we find iron replacing wood, and coal and 
coke replacing charcoal as the primary source of fue.1. The rapid over­
all pace of industrialization was also accompanied by increasing 
capital intensity and associated scales. Increasing pressure for 
labor-saving technology in industry, together with the existence of 
·a large, dependable and expanding domestic market, propelled by the 
expansion of the railroad, provided the cornerstone for the "American 
10System" of mass production. 
10see also H. J; Habbakuk, American and British Technolo in the
19th Century (Cambridge University Press, 1962 , for a detailed U.S./
U.K. comparison. 
-17-
In U. s. agriculture, the favorable man/land ratio led to a 
mechanization trend, initially of the horse-drawn variety, later of 
the tractor type--both labor-saving and land-using in character. 
The application of what Hayami and Ruttan have called the biological/ 
chemical kind of technology change did not seriously come into its own 
until after the closing of the frontier (circa 1890) seemed to make 
such increased reliance on the resource-saving effects of science 
rather more warranted. 
But the patterns which evolved in Britain, the Continent and the 
United States over time were due as well to government policies which 
acted either to facilitate or to obstruct the system's above-described 
accommodations to its changing relative endowments and capacities. 
With respect to Britain, for example, a policy of substantial laissez 
faire which had been a liberating advantage in the 18th and early 19th 
centuries vis-a-vis the more mercantilist and still somewhat feudalistic 
countries of Europe may have become a handicap later on. When technical 
education continued to enjoy a relatively low prestige and, as Cardwell 
puts it, the Indian Civil Service Exam drew more attention than the Cam­
bridge Mathematics Tripos, the government, instead of leaning against 
this wind, chose to stand aside. With supremacy already having been 
a~hieved in textiles and metallurgy and colonial markets safely pro­
tected, it did not feel the need to encourage scienfific research or 
education. Delegations of businessmen visiting the U.S. in the 1850's 
could not convince the establishment at home that anything was amiss. 
It took World War I to bring a sharp realization of the extent to 
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which Britain had become dependent on German science and science 
education and on U.S. machinery engineering accomplishments. It was 
only then that (belated) government action was taken. Cardwell, in 
fact, notes that even to this day, in spite of the new universities 
of the post-War era and the increase in defense-related R & D, Britain 
still finds herself in something of a "technology trap," with higher 
· technical education something of a step-child and routinized R & D 
not yet a major management tool. 
Nineteenth century Germany, on the other hand, represented, as 
Fischer puts it, a case of "Smithian liberalism tamed by enlightened 
governmentalism." Spurred by the threat of British economic hegemony 
as well as by competition among the various German states, these 
governments generally did not question their responsibility to 
help--either via protective tariffs, as in the case of the rise of the 
important beet sugar industry, or via the support of scientific research 
labs and scientific education--as in the case of the von Humboldt 
reforms. Prussia went so far.as to set up costly state enterprises 
and to issue invitations to moneyed private parties to establish 
factories; but mostly, in contrast to the heavy interventionism of 
the French, the German effort was a more indirect one, e.g., via 
expositions, awards, subsidies, technical advice, and the estab-
lishment of a whole network of technical and scientific institutions 
at various levels, to provide formal training, from engineers and 
mechanics to manual arts and design. German government assi$tance to 
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the institutionalization of private credit and the provision of 
public overheads, via the Credit Mobilier type of mechanism, compared 
increasingly favorably with the inadequacies of the British private 
market for venture capital. 
Even with respect to the acquisition of general cognitive skills 
by the population as a whole, Britain remained elitist and indifferent 
by contrast. In 1860, for example, only 50% of British school-aged 
children attended elementary schools; in Germany, as a consequence of 
compulsory education laws, the equivalent figure was more than 97%. 
This is in addition to a longer period of schooling and a quality 
differential in favor of Germany. As Landes put :i.t, "once science 
began to anticipate technique--and it was already doing so to some 
extent in the l850's--formal education became a major industrial 
resource. 1111 While the :British turned to enjciy their successes of 
the past in a gentlemanly fashion, exhibiting an increasing disdain 
for the (underpaid) scientist and the technically educated , German 
princes vied with each other in founding technical schools and 
research institutes as well as becoming the patrons of individual 
scientists. 
The role of government in the United States, while clearly more 
limited than in Continental Europe, also served to facilitate the 
system's path in the directions indicated. Rosenberg, in commenting 
on the growth of the multi-faceted U. s. machinery industry, speaks 
of a surprising volume of public/private collaboration in "visiting 
one another's plants, sharing new technological knowledge and even 
11n. s. Landes, op. cit., p. 150. 
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occasionally borrowing one another's workmen." Other observers 
place heavy emphasis on the role of widespread general education which 
provided for a measure of technical literacy at lower skill levels-­
and for substantial empirical problem-solving capacity at higher 
levels. Even if most technology was borrowed and even if there was 
no first-rate scientific establishment in evidence, Rosenberg observes 
that the U. S. was "highly discriminating in borrowing patterns and 
highly selective in the uses to which imported technologies were put." 
Clearly, the mechanical skills and ingenuity required for th.is task 
were considerable. And while the U. S. produced little in the way of 
contributions to frontier science until much later, the diffusion 
of labor-saving technology change and adaptations,from firearms to 
clocks, to watches, to harvesters and to typewriters, all part 
of the "American system~• required engineers who had at least a 
grounding in science and its use, even if they were not active 
contributors to it. 
Little wonder that the 19th century United States attitude 
towards science and technology has often been called extremely 
pragmatic. While higher risk basic science was neglected, technology 
was borrowed and improved upon. The continuing shortage of labor 
resulted in continuing labor-saving technology bias. Only.agriculture 
was, to some extent, an exception; with private risks larger, so was 
the role of government. The unique institutional framework focussed 
on the land grant college system was able to generate substantial 
technology change tied to progress in the chemistry-related agricultural 
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sciences and diffused widely after the turn of the century. 
Nineteenth century United States may thus be characterizedas a 
frontier society disposing over what seemed like unlimited natural 
resources, including fuel, and therefore, unlike Germany, not much 
inclined to invest heavily in basic science. Nevertheless, innovative 
activity, based largely on imported technology and assisted by public 
sector action, especially in education and agricultural research and 
extension, proceeded at a very rapid pace, associated with rapid 
increases in per capita income. If we accept the notion, previously 
put forward, that all technology is likely to be, directly or 
indirectly, science-based, it is nevertheless true that this divergence 
of the historical paths taken by the two early followers, Germany 
and the United States, is most instructive. It tells us that a 
combination of differential endowments and policies may lead one 
country to participate in growth via basic science and science­
intensive industries, another by borrowing technology and using 
a broadly-based scientific literacy to improve upon and diffuse 
such technology. 
III. The Late Followers: Hungary. and Japan 
Turning our attention to the two successful late-followers in 
our sample of historical country cases, Hungary and Japan, we ma:y 
note, that, in terms of initial endowment and international "oppor~ 
tunities," the gap between them and the early arrivals was . 
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substantial, probably as substantial as that between the late followers 
and today's LDC's. 
Hungary, for example, had a considerable disadvantage in terms 
of human and natural resource endowment relative to Britain, Germany 
or the United States. While she shared with thenr a common European 
cultural heritage, she was not, in fact, a full member of the elite 
inner circle of scientific / industrial exchanges via trade, migration, 
profes~ional meetings, industrial exhibitions, etc., all of which had 
such an active life in Western Europe, especially after the middle of 
the nineteenth century. When to this is added the effects of 150 years 
of Turkish occupation, frequent wars and the strong grip of feudalism, 
we should not be surprised that the transition to modern growth was 
delayed by at least half a century. 
As Szant6, Vas-Zoltan and Cst5ndes put it, Hungary experienced 
a "second edition" of serfdom between the 16th and 18th centuries, 
while Western Europe was undergoing a major transition into mature 
growth, combining a free labor·force and nationalistic governments 
to build, first conunercial and overhead, later the basic fixed indus­
trial capital structure required. But perhaps Hungary's biggest handi­
cap was that there was littfe possibility for an agricultural revolu­
tion preceding (and fuelling) the industrial revolution to follow; and 
when the possibilities for "catching up" :finally existed, Hungary was 
assigned a position within the Habsburg Empire which did not permit 
them to be adequately pursued. The quasi-colonial division of labor 
under the Austro-Hungarian regime called for Austria, Bohemia and 
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Moravia to provide the industrial base, with Hungary assigned to a 
largely agricultural role. While this might have been an appropriate 
static role initially, this colonial assignation of resource alloca­
tion deprived Hungary of a chance to move gradually into industrial 
activities of comparative advantage until much later. 
The Hungarian paper reports that in the middle of the seventeenth 
century, only one university was in existence, in an area not under 
Turkish rule. By the end of the 19th century, a number of universities 
and institutes had been established, making their contribution to both 
science and technology. However, in spite of increasing state support 
to redress the balance within the Empire after 1867, via subsidies, 
improved conditions for attracting foreign capital, and enhanced support 
for scientitic agriculture (in the inter-war period), continued political 
instability handicapped Hungary's development until virtually World 
War II. 
Since then, under the socialist mode of organization, a sub-
stantial effort has·been made ~o "catch up," mainly by the extensive 
use of R & D allocations. The latter have increased at a more rapid 
rate than GNP and are now reported at 3% of GNP, one of the highest 
on record. But as Szanto, Vas-Zoltan and Csondes acknowledge, in 
spite of the 1968 reforms which, inter alia, served to encourage R & D 
by making it chargeable as a current cost, as yet "the incentives of 
production••• do not seem to give adequate encouragement to the assimilation 
of newly developed technologies." 
Japan represents the ease of a small late-comer country 
which can today even more definitively be labelled mature. Like 
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Hungary, Japan before the Restoration in 1868 may be considered 
feudal and poor, although it had the definite advantage of not having 
been subjected to colonialism and of having experienced substantial 
development of her internal markets and of her agricultural and human 
infrastructure during the Tokugawa period. While her "initial condi­
tionsll may thus be considered favorable relative to most contemporary 
LDC's, her successful transition to modern growth from initial 
endowments substantially closer to those of LDC's than those of Western 
Europe or the_U.S. has aroused unusually strong interest among develop­
ment analysts and policy makers. 
Most observers, including Nakayama, have detected the existence 
of important sub-phases in Japan's transition, during which the rela­
tionships among science, technology and growth underwent considerable 
change. Partly because of the extra-territoriality treaties imposed 
by the West and partly because of the long seclusion period pre-dating 
the Restoration, Japan's initi~l efforts to support her industrialization 
drive via government intervention--what we would call import substitution 
today~~represented a relatively mild version. Nevertheless, as Nakayama 
also reports; YB do encounter, between 1868 and roughly 1890, determined 
goverment efforts to "catch up with the West". With protective tariffs 
largely unavailable, government intervention took the form of public 
sectpr participation in di,rectly productive activities, subsidies and 
other ways of influencing relative·factor and product prices. 
The Meiji government initially encouraged the large-scale borrow­
ing of technology.from abroad for both the agricultural and non-
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agricultural sectors. As Nakayama points out, substantital errors 
were connnitted by attempting to apply Western-style, land-abundant 
agricultural methods--mainly developed for wheat--to a small-scale, 
land-scarce rice economy. Similar errors were connnitted in industry 
by importing inappropriate "turn-key" technology for use in public 
sector plants, some of which subsequently failed. Both the advice 
of the large numbers of foreign experts which were invited and the 
findings of the even larger numbers of Japanese sent abroad to 
reconnoiter as to the "right" country from which to borrow were 
frequently wide of the mark during this period. 
While these facts have often been lost sight of by overly 
enthusiastic observers of the Japanese experience, it is perhaps more 
instructive to note that it took the Japanese relatively little time 
to recognize not only that imported technology had to be selected 
carefully, in the first instance, but also that, ·for maximum effec­
tiveness, it had to be substantially adapted to local conditions. 
In agriculture, for example, (except for the northern island of 
Hokkaido which had an atypical, almost U.S.~like, factor endowment) 
attention had shifted completely by the early 1880's from labor­
saving (mechanization-oriented) Western methods to the diffusion of 
land-saving (fertilizer and cultivation practice oriented) technology 
using the experienced or "Veteran Farmers", supported by government 
demonstration farm and extension efforts. 12 In industry, trial and 
12 Hayami and Yamada ("Technological Progress in Agriculture,11 
in Klein and Ohkawa, eds., Economic Growth: The Ja anese Ex erience 
Since the Meiji Era, _Irwin, 1968 have demonstrated that the diffusion 
to all parts of Japan, of the best-known agricultural practices of the 
day accounted for most of the (substantial) growth of agricultural 
productivity during this period. 
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error led to greater reliance on private sector decisions as to 
appropriate technology choice. In 1885, Nakayama reports, the Ministry 
of Technology was dissolved--and the gradual withdrawal (by sale to the 
private sector) of the government from all but some heavy industries 
was more or less completed by 1890. 
The Japanese case has often been cited in support of the notion 
that a country can stay out of high-risk science and concentrate instead 
on lower-risk technology imports. The Meiji government spent relatively 
little effort or resources on the advancement of pure science. Yet the quick 
empirically-based response of Japanese engineers and industrialists would 
not have been possible without a strong and well dispersed educational 
base, both general and technical, which had been part of the Japanese 
scene from the beginning. To borrow wisely and to adapt, with an eye 
to differences in both the endowment and demand patterns, requires, as 
Nakayama points out, intermediate-level scientific manpower, not "big 
science" or heavy R & D expenditures which the Japanese generally made 
13efforts to avoid. In this s~nse, we may detect a strong parallel 
with the 19th century U.S. case: pragmatic borrowing of technology. 
· from abroad, plus extensive indigenous technology change supported by 
high, well-distributed levels of scientific and technical literacy. 
Nakayama notes that the early public sector's import-intensive 
industrialization efforts were dominated by ex-samurai who had been 
displaced by the abolition of feudal rights. It is equally interesting 
to observe that many of the medium- and small-scale private entrepreneurs 
13
Except, apparently, when the customer was the milttary. 
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who later helped shift the center of gravity to indigenous technological 
experiementation and adaptation came from the ronin or lower (and less 
well-connected) strata of samurai. 
Production increases based on the diffusion of the "best" known 
agricultural technology naturally ran out of steam after some time, 
and,as Nakayama reports, chemical science""'intensive agricultural inno­
vations became increasingly important after 1885. The trend quickly 
spread to the agricultural° input industries, e.g., tools, seeds, ferti­
lizer, with substantial science-intensive (mostly Germany-oriented) 
technology change in evidence. This was also the time when government 
support of industry in general, as we have seen, became more indirect 
than direct and, incidentally, more export-oriented (and thus of 
necessity more competitive) than during the import substitution period. 
With respect to industrial technology, the need to compete in 
international markets for silk, cotton yarn, textiles and, later, 
rubber and electrical goods, provided an added impetus to the search 
for additional innovations and.adaptations intensive in the relatively 
14abundant unskilled labor force. Nakayama cites the rather remarkable 
increase in patent applications during this period, the large majority 
.of which were process- rather than product-related. A piece of inter-
esting historical evidence which has come to this author's attention 
is the switch from mule to ring spindles in the Japanese cotton spinning 
industry in 1887. Rings, it turned out, could acconnnodate much 
14
See the author's "Factor Proportions in Japanese Economic 
Development," American Ecoiioniic·Review, September 1957. 
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more unskilled labor per unit .of capital, could produce a wider 
variety of yarn quality and could accommodate greater variations 
in the quality of the raw cotton input. What is most interesting 
for our purposes is the almost instantaneous switch of all cotton 
textile mills in Japan while Indian textile mills, supplied at 
the time mainly by the same capital exporter (Flatt's of London), 
and facing an even more extreme surplus of unskilled labor, 
substantially stayed with the less efficient mule technology. 
Some observers would place the approximate date of Japan's success­
ful transition into modern growth shortly after World War I, others, 
15after World Way II. What is more important for our purposes, however, 
in that in Japan, as in the U.S., technology and industry became more 
directly science-based or science-intensive in the inter-war period, with basic 
sciences receiving major attention for the first time, as reflected in the 
growth of public and private research labs, the rise of sponsored 
research and university science departments, and the growing demands 
of the military. Nakayama considers the creation of Riken (the Insti-
tute for Physical and Chemical Research) in 1917 ·-to be a· landmark, with 
85% of the funds coming from industry rather than government. Another 
was the creation in 1931 of the Japan Foundation for the Promotion of 
Science. At the s.ame time, Japan, which had never really opened its 
15 See , for example, Fei and Ranis, Development of the Labor
Surplus Econo!11Y: Theory and Policy, Irwin, 1964, and R. Minami, The TurningPoint in Japanese Economic Development, Tokyo Univ. Press, 1970. 
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6doors to direct foreign private investment ~ now experienced a new 
wave of foreign technology inflow embodied in joint venture or licensing 
arrangements (e.g., the G.E./Shibaura alliance, responded to by the 
agreement between Westinghouse and Mitsubishi). Also an increasing 
number of indigenous innovations, beginning with the Toyoda 
loom. but moving into chemistry and later to electronics and re-
lated fields, began to make their appearance. Clearly, as in Germany 
at an earlier date, science had become increasingly viewed as an essen­
tial national instrument, especially in countries such as Japan, short 
of natural resources, and thus increasingly dependent, once labor 
surplus had become exhausted, on the ingenuity and resourcefulness of 
their people. 
V. The Developing Countries: Brazil and Ghana 
Brazil and Ghana are the two developing countries represented in 
our study. As is so frequently the case when anyone attempts to 
generalize about''the" developing world, these two systems clearly have 
as many differences between them as they do with respect to a "typical" 
developed economy. While it might be useful to deal with our two 
cases within the context of a systematic typological framework which 
differentiates among LDC families, for example,by size, land/labor ratios 
and/or human resource endowment, this would take us beyond the limits of 
16 
The minor flows in the 19th century and the rather more substan­
tial flows thereafter mainly took the fonn of loan capital. The absence 
of any marked colonial pressure surely had its effects in precluding 
the appearance of some of the more customary manifestations, of multi­
national business interests. 
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time and space of the present paper. We will therefore attempt to 
draw what reasonable generalizations seem to emerge concerning the 
relationships among science, technology and development in the LDC 
case, and content ourselves with an occasional comment concerning 
relevant intra-LDC differences. 
Both Brazil and Ghana begin as colonial entities, with 
much of the observed pattern of resource allocation and growth 
dictated by the needs of that system. Pastore and Ayensu report 
on the almost exclusive public sector emphasis of science during 
this period and the concentration on flora, fauna and geological.- -~ 
surveys--mainly aimed at the location and exploitation of primary 
raw materials. It was gold, then mainly cotton, sugar and coffee 
in Brazil; gold, then cocoa, in Ghana. But the patterns were the same. 
In both cases we witness not only a neglect of industry--in fact, some 
destruction of artisan production by industrial imports--but also of 
food-producing domestically-oriented agriculture.17 And in both cases 
the concern with the exportable cash crop is supplemented mainly by an 
. . ..
interest in health, and the required adaptation of medical science to 
the overseas territory. Colonial governments thus clearly recognized 
that some indigenous scientific capacity was required in agriculture 
and health where local conditions with respect to soil, climate and 
disease potentials are likely to vary substantially. 
llThis, incidentally, differentiates the Japanese colonial system,
e.g., in Korea and Taiwan, from others. But that is because, .. once
domestic Japanese agriculture ran out of 'steam early in this century,
it was food which the mother country wanted from her colonies in this
case. 
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Political independence, of course, came much earlier to Brazil, 
which emerged from its'!Iberian period" in the early 19th century, than 
to Ghana which did not become independent of England until the 1950's. 
Nevertheless, as Pastore is at pains to point out, political indepen-
dence did not alter the basic triangular colonial pattern of resource 
flows in Brazil until the 1930's. Both systems, Brazil's in response to 
the international vagaries of the Great Depression, Ghana's in pursuit 
of domestically-oriented national development goals under Nkrumah, 
embarked on a fairly standard type of import-substitution industriali­
zation strategy. Abstracting from the differences in the sizes of the 
two domestic markets, the sheer volume of natural resources available, 
the extent of regional diversity and the educational base achieved, 
import substitution in both cases meant a rather determined effort to 
import advanced coW1try industrial technology without much emphasis on 
indigenous science, on the one hand, or technology adaptation, on the other, 
and with a continuation--if now for somewhat different reasons--of the 
policy of relative neglect of food producing domestic agriculture. 
Since the agricultural hinterland remains the large and crucial sec-
tor in most LDC' s, whe_ther measured in terms of people, output, or the 
potential for the application of science-based technology, this contin­
uation of colonial neglect under independent national governments is 
of great concern. Rice and maize research in Ghana received as scant 
attention as beans and rice in Brazil. Cocoa and coffee, on the 
other hand, continued to be viewed as the major source of fuel 
for the operation of the system and thus received most of the 
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attention of _agricultural research concerned with variety improvements, 
new fertilizer combinations, resistance to plant disease, etc. Pastore 
records some recent changes in Brazil in this respect; the situation is 
less clear in Ghana--certainly the institution of the state farm system 
there did not encourage cultivator pressure or receptivity. 
With respect to industry, Pastore finds not only Brazilian tech-
nology but the entire pattern of growth still heavily influenced by 
foreigners--if now via the multi-national corporation--even during the 
import substitution sub-phase of development. He notes that "domestic 
technological and scientific establishments were not encouraged to 
innovate," and that a surprising 62% of industrial know-how still emanates 
from abroad, with half of large-scale Brazilian firms holding permanent 
foreign technical contracts. Science, until quite recently,apparently re­
mained a highly individualistic Europe-oriented art form. The first science or 
technology oriented University level training programs did not begin until 
the 1930 1s, and then with a still expressly abstract slant. It should 
not surprise us that the porti9n of Brazilian output growth not attri­
butable to incJ:'8ases in physical inputs--which, with all its short-
comings, is called''technology change"--has been measured in the vicinity 
of 20%, as opposed to 40% to 80% for the advanced countries. Pastore is 
undoubtedly correct in concluding that the development of science cannot 
be left to laissez faire forces if the requisite critical mass of human 
and physical resources is to become available. 
On the other hand, we note that heavy government intervention in science 
I. 
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(and technology)--which certainly was the situation in Ghana during the 
Nkrumah period--by no means guarantees a more favorable outcome. 
Ayensu is kinder than this observer in his evaluation of the long~term 
developmental impact of Nkrumah's Science City, the Volta River project, 
and other large-scale government efforts aimed at forcing Ghana into 
modernity, without the benefits of a fully socialist institutional 
structure. He nevertheless recognizes that. the increasingly heavy 
government participation in directly productive activities during the 
First and Second Plans could not solve (I would say probably worsened) 
the middle-level management capacity shortage in the country. In fact, 
there should be little surprise, given Ayensu's own figures of only 
1.4% of school-going males and .7% of school-going females getting even 
a modest technical or commercial education, that the Ghana 
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has performed as 
badly as he reports. 
Even where the effort is less extreme, and the economy remains more 
"mixed," there seems to be ample evidence that "in general, import 
substitution policy and full-scale protection of consumer goods industry 
have tended to promote a passive attitude to the utilization and develop­
ment of indigenous R & D efforts, during the early phase of industrial 
development. nlS The distortions affecting output c3.nd. technology choice, 
both in terms of relative prices and lack of competitive pressures, in 
18Nam Kee Lee, "Technological Development and the Role of R & D 
Institutes in Developing Countries," I.L.O. Working Paper, p. 19. 
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favor of modern "engineering" and against c1;ppropriate "economic" 
choices, are well known. The relevant issue rather is how severe are 
the import substitution policies and for how long are they maintained? 
For, while it is generally acknowledged that they have a valid and 
important role to play in the early post~colonial life of an LDC still 
lacking in industrial entrepreneurial capacity, the fact is that they 
as often convert themselves into ballast which is later politically 
difficult to discard. While Ghana remains in the fairly early stages 
of non-durable consumer goods (primary) lmport substitution,. it is, 
we believe, accurate to say that Brazil, except for a brief 1963-68· 
interlude, has intensified her import substitution policies, moving 
into the technically more complicated (secondary import substitution) 
industries,, i.e., durable conswner goods, capital goods and raw material 
processing. Such a shift, if anything, is yet more dependent on foreign 
technology and yet more dissociated from domestic scientific or adaptive 
technological ingenuity. We agree with Pastore that "a strong scientific 
establishment is necessary in ~rder to m1derstand trans-national know­
ledge, both in science and technology." We would only add that the 
dimension of"strength" involved includes the capacity to choose, and to 
reject, to adapt and to diffuse; the contrast in performance between a 
relatively small natural resources poor island nation, Japan, which pro-
ceeded to turn outward after a period of relatively mild import substitution, 
and large, natural resources abundant Brazil, is bound to be instructive 
in these ~espects~ 
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VI. ~iridirigs arid Conclusions 
In these last few pages we will attempt to record some of the 
findings and insights that seem to have emerged with respect to the 
many complicated questions raised-focussing mainly on those facets 
of historical experience which may serve to illuminate basic contem­
porary developing country concerns. These are personal conclusions 
drawn from the seven country papers as well as other sources and-­
just as the rest of this effort--do not implicate the individual 
authors in any way. Almost all countries today accept the importance 
of the impact of technology on growth--as well as on distribution 
and other important dimensions of development. But they are pro­
foundly uneasy as to how much of their technology can be, or should 
be, home-grown, imported and/or imported and adapted. They are even 
more uneasy with respect to the volume of resources and energy they 
should commit to basic science as the underpinning for technology 
change. Waiving other motivations and considerations, in other words, 
they are concerned about the price of the "ticket of admission" to 
the community of science. 
Our analysis of the role of science and technology in the history 
of the now developed countries led us to conclude that to divide tech­
nology into empirically-based and science-based categories is likely 
to be off the mark. Epochal technological change of the type we have 
become accustomed to in the 20th century is lik~ly to be more directly 
related to major scientific breakthroughs than irt the past. We need only 
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think of electronics, plastics, the computer, atomic energy, .to make 
• 19 .the point. In the 18th and 19th centuries, on the other hand, the 
pace of science was slower--some would say "big science" had not as 
yet arrived--and consequently any epochal technology change such as 
the steam engine, equally based on a major scientific discovery, might 
yield its technological impacts and applications over a longer 
period and in more diffuse ways. This does not make the sum of such 
innovations less science-based, but rather less science-intensive. 
Second, keeping the United States and Japanese experiences 
particularly in mind, these systems were admittedly not pioneers in 
frontier science; but they developed a definite capacity to absorb 
science as a necessary basis for their own very substantial achieve­
ments in importing and adapting technology. As Kuznets has pointed 
out, 20 this capacity to use science wisely is more likely to be national 
rather than supra-national. But it does not just happen• It is related 
to the educational system, to the national ethos, as well as to the 
types of interventions, direct or indirect, practiced by governments. 
An educational system which imparts a modicum of scientific under­
standing to a substantial portion of the population, a pragmatic 
"catch-up" philosophy which accompanies "late-comer" 
19
As a recent OECD study (The Conditions for Success in-Techno­
logical Innovation, OECD, Paris, 1971) noted: "Technological innova­
tion·is as old as man, but it is only in the 20th century that science,
technology and industrial firms have come together to play such an 
important role in it." 
20
In private correspondence with the author. 
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status, and national governments' willingness to move away from 
dirigiste mercantilist interventions can provide basic building 
blocks for this type of science capacity at a relatively early stage 
of a country's development. As the experience of both Japan and 
(especially) the U. S. also illustrates, the same country may later, 
in its modern growth phase, acquire the capacity to advance the 
international frontiers of science. 
The "typical" contemporary LDC thus cannot afford to "sit back" 
and let the advanced countries incur all the expenditures attached to 
the trials and errors of international science--especially not n0~·in the 
twentieth century when the pace of science has much accelerated and 
the gap between it and technology narrowed. Yet it cannot afford, and 
should not try, to "show the flag" in every field of basic scientific 
endeavor; the less developed world is strewn with scientific institutes 
and other expensive white elephants which contribute neither to science 
nor to technology. Most observers agree that the biggest waste 
of all is second-rate basic research. The "middle road" points in the 
direction of a broad enough spread of science and technical education 
and a flexible enough economic environment to permit both appropriate 
scientific and technological choices as well as indigenous improvements 
and adaptations. International science is only slightly more a "free 
good" than technology; there are important search, identification, 
transfer and assimilation costs involved. 
Julian Engel sees "little justification [in LDC's] for basic 
research except for sustaining a viable teaching effort and keeping 
your best brains at home." This is in general accord with our above 
position except that it may go too far. There are fields of scientific 
endeavor which must be strongly represented within the LDC's because 
of their country- or region-specific character. The best 
examples are in agriculture and health. Without basic agricultural 
science-oriented research on a country or at least regional basis, the 
recent chemistry and Mendelian law-based innovations which have gone 
under the name of the Green Revolution do not, as we are now finding 
out, have the necessary sustaining power and the necessary defense 
against specific local (e.g., pest and disease) problems. Similarly, in the 
field of health, few people would argue that one trans-national science 
can really be equally responsive to the very differentiated conditions 
around the globe. It is in such areas that the "puzzle"-solving capacity 
of science in response to technological problems clearly requires a f.irst­
rate scientific establishment. 
Are there other areas in which the same criteria apply? This is 
perhaps the most difficult question of all. In one sense, all 
human activity is affected, to a larger or smaller extent, by the 
particular soil, climate and other conditions under which it is 
carried out. It is, for example, relevant even in industry--think of the 
relationship of fertilizer and agricultural implements to the conditions of 
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the soil, and of the importance of humidity and temperature conditions-­
as well as natural fiber quality--to spinning and weaving operations. 
Where then does the need for individual LDC basic research end-~and the 
caveats against a wasteful buck-shot approach take hold? 
This is by no means an easy matter on which to pontificate in an 
abstract way. This observer would insist, nevertheless, that the 
burden of proof be on those who would like to initiate advanced uni­
versity training and basic research, including some obligation to 
demonstrate a flexible, time-phased relevance to technology changes-­
which, in turn, can be expected to affect the productive system. This 
may seem like the typical hard-headed, narrow economist's prescription. 
What about the importance of those many possible chance inter-connections, 
decades apart, which may flow, in some entirely unpredictable way, 
from what looks like some unconnected.intellectual pursuit? Without 
disparaging these possibilities in any way, we would respond--if we 
are indeed offended by the spectacle of open heart research in countries 
where malnutrition is a prevalent phenomenon--that science really 
sh<;mld not expect to be entirely outside the realm of some flexible, 
sophisticated version of cost-benefit analysis. Such analysis must 
try to balance the potential benefits against the possible alternative 
allocations of scarce financial and {perhaps more important) human 
resources. The higher risks of science--partly due to the uncertainty 
of predicting future two-way interactions between science and technology, 
and partly to the likely inappropriability nationally of any such 
"returns"--render this task unusually difficult. But analysis must still 
be done; an act of faith does not suffice. 
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In addition to placing the burden of proof on those who would 
like to have LDC's purchase the "price of admission" in a given field 
of basic scientific endeavor, it m~ght be possible--although admittedly 
difficult--to encourage much more specialization, at least within,and 
possibly also among LDC's on a regional basis. This type of agreement 
has been reached, for example, in the case of European atomic energy 
and ballistics research and African efforts.to combat yellow fever 
and rinderpest, i.e. , where the required scale and the need to avoid 
expensive duplication were sufficient to overcome nationalistic 
jealousies. Although the record on similar inter-LDC agreements in 
the field of common market investment allocations, etc. , has not been 
terribly encouraging, it has been somewhat better with respect to the 
use of regional training institutes and research organizations-- whenever 
~egionalism is not forced but flows from the recognition of mutual 
self-interest. 
If we agree that no country can really afford to be either a 
full-time borrower of science or an across-the-board contributor to it-­
what about technology? First of all, our historical forays seem to 
clearly indicate support for the Bemal-Kuznets position that tech­
nology gives rise to as many leading "puzzles" required for further 
scientific progress as the other way around. Consequently, much of 
what we had to say above applies to technology as well. When we are 
speaking about a society's national capacity to-utilize and modify 
international science creatively, we are also referring to a kindred 
capacity to s•lect appropriate technology and adapt it to differing 
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environments. If we but keep in mind that contributions to human 
knowledge which_break new ground and provide scope for major new 
technological breakthroughs will, with few exceptions, remain the 
· province of the leading mature countries, what can we say about the 
direction new science-intensive and engineering-intensive technology 
change is likely to take? 
The two elements which seem most responsible for this 
direction are·changing resource endowments and public policy. The 
very different behavior of the natural-resources-rich labor-scarce 
United States relative to a relatively capital-scarce England and a 
Germany which felt cramped for natural resources should be instruc-
tive in this respect. Engineering-intensive technology took a different, 
more capital-intensive path in the wide open spaces of the U.S. than 
in England. And, in Germany, metallurgical science responded to the 
needs of a high phosphoric iron ore content~ official encouragement 
of the entire chemical industry was based on the felt need to overcome, 
by artificial or synthetic short-cuts, the relative unkindness of 
nature. Japan, after first exploring her abundant labor resources-­
and taking an engineering-intensive route analogous to that of 
the U.S., but capital-saving--has, with the disappearance of that 
labor surplus, tended to place more of her eggs in electronics and 
other high technology baskets. 
But,as has also been pointed out, while government policies 
cannot legislate away the basic endowment of a society, they can, 
if flexible and able to overcome narrow sectio.nal interests, 
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provide an important assist to the transition effort of a de~el­
oping economy as its endowment changes with time. Analogously, 
if dominated by narrow vested interests and/or lacking 
in historical perspective, such policies can attempt to draw a veil 
over the endowment and lead the system into expensive scientific/ 
technological dead-ends and economic stagnation. While there is no 
rigid uni-directional sequence of phases which every LDC must somehow 
traverse on the path to mature growth, some attention to the changing 
roles of science and technology in terms of a 
o . 
changing resource endow-
ment and, especially, changing human capacities is essential in all but 
21t he most unusual cases. 
At the micro and institution-building level, the appropriate role 
of government in the mixed economy context is, of course, not unrelated 
to the appropriability or non-appropriability of the new knowledge 
0 
acquired. Investment in basic science carries a high risk, in part 
because of its, at best, indirect and long-term relationship 
with technology and growth, but·partly also because it is generally 
an international good not even appropriable by a country, not to speak 
of any private party within the country. As we move from basic inter-
national science to changes in technology, risks are reduced and private 
appropriability becomes much more important. As the extent of appropri­
ability rises, so, nonnally, does the level of private R & D expenditures. 
21 
A country like Kuwait, for example, may be able to buy its way into 
the charmed circle with turn-key oil-oriented technology but, even there,
there is some doubt as to whether it qualifies as a mature economy.
It certainly does not meet all the Kuznetsian stylized attributes of 




Appropriability, of course, depends not only on how basic the 
research effort but also on the overall state of competitiveness or 
non-competitiveness of the system. This is partly a function of the 
overall policy environment; for example, during periods of intense 
import substituting industrial protection and large unearned profits, 
there would seem to be less interest on the part of industrialists to 
search for the best technology; instead, satisficing behavior and the 
use of inappropriate (often prestige) technology seems to frequently 
d • l - • • • b h . 22isp ace maximizing e avior. But, for any given industry or sector, 
the state of competitiveness also depends on conditions peculiar to 
the particular market, with respect to goods, information or technology. 
Agriculture, for example, is typically the most competitive field, 
therefore exhibiting the least private appropriability possibilities 
and the least willingness (or capacity) by individual farmers to 
incur R & D expenditures. Consequently, not only basic scientific 
agricultural research but also the search for appropriate adaptive 
technology and even its dissemination to individual farmers usually 
represents activities (and costs) which fall to the public sector. 
Ditto for health--except perhaps even more so. This is fairly well 
recognized. But what is perhaps less well understood is the fact that 
there exist other industries--again on a continuum moving through 
agricultural processing and input industries to light cons\Dller goods, 
sane services, and beyond--where similar characteristics abound, i.e., 
22
For more on this, see the author's "Appropriate Technology in 
the Dual Economy: Reflections on Philippine and Taiwanese Experience,"
International Economic Association, 1976. 
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a competitive market structure, the relative absence of scale advantages, 
and thus the need for possible government involvement in R & D, education 
and extension. If, in the absence of pronounced market imperfections, 
new technology can be selectively borrowed from abroad, the burden on 
high cost domestic R & Dis reduced and a miniml.llll of government support 
can lead to rapid diffusion of technology change. This certainly was the 
case for Japan. Here the profound technology change associated with the 
switch from mule to ring cotton spindling in the late nineteeth century was 
diffused as rapidly as the agricultural practices of the "Veteran Farmers." 
Whether or not, in mature market economies, competitive 
or non-competitive industrial configurations yield relatively more 
private R &D activity remains an as yet unresolved empirical issue. 
Competitive industries have more incentive but less capacity. With 
respect ~o the LDC's, it seems to us, any viable science and technology 
policy must begin with an examination of the extent of the overall 
competitive pressures felt by individual decision-makers with respect 
to economic versus engineering ·choices • It must include sensitivity 
to differences in the market structures of specific industries, and 
considera't:ion of selective government action in creating social over­
heads in the science and technology arena. Such interventions 
may be addressed to ensuring that existing technological alternatives 
are known to all sizes of firms, or to helping expand the range of 
alternatives via the support of university or R & D institute activity. 
In either case it is, however, important to ensure not only that the 
areas of activity are selected with some of the (flexible) cost/benefit 
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considerations previously referred to in mind, but also that the 
specific activities supported within these fields carry built-in 
devices to ensure that the criteria of ultimate contributions to 
social and economic development and not any exclusively internal 
criteria of the "invisible college" are addressed. One such device, 
frequently referred to, is that government subsidy of R & D institutes 
be set on a long-term declining basis, with private sector contracts 
forced to fill the widening gap. Another is to·concentrate scarce 
attention on the more competitive "non-appropriable" sectors and, in 
fact, to ensure that access to information as well as to the required 
complementary inputs is relatively equal across firms. 
One dimension of this general problem which has been mentioned only 
fleetingly thus far is that of process versus product innovation. 
Economists, as this paper well demonstrates, spend most of their time 
discussing technique or process change while industrialists and R & D 
allocators spend most of their energies and resources on product change. 
When technology change is of the cataclysmic or epochal·type, e.g., the 
invention of the automobile based on the principle of combustion, it 
is more of a semantic issue whether we call this a change in the trans­
portation process or a change in product (from·the horse and buggy); 
but when we are dealing·with more common sequential and adaptive 
innovations, the distinction may be more real and related to the com­
petitiveness of markets. It seems clear, for example, that product 
differentiation is of greater importance in less competitive markets and 
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process differentiation more important in competitive markets. If we 
apply, if loosely (and briefly), the product cycle idea, it is clear 
that patents and trademarks may represent one device to extend the 
period of quasi-monopoly position beyond what would be possible via 
simple process and price considerations. The contrasting role in today's 
LDC's, of the contemporary Japanese multi-national corporation, which 
is largely process and price oriented, and that of the U.S. multi­
national which is largely product and quality oriented, is rather 
startling in this regard. It is no accident that the distribution of 
domestic patents as between process and product innovations today is 
overwhelmingly in favor of process in Japan and of product in the U. S. 
In an earlier day the U.S. was process oriented relative to the product 
orientation of the U.K. In recent years, Japan is itself shifting towards 
product innovation. It thus appears, ceteris paribus, that the richer 
and more scale-dominated the mature economy becomes, the more important 
0is the relative role of product innovations. 
This question of competitiveness is, of course, of importance for 
the developing economy subject to the blandishments of domestic as well 
as. foreign technology salesmen, with respect to both process and product. 
Schmookler long aso pointed to the importance of demand factors in 
technology change.- Whether the change in product quality is real or 
1magined, carries additional real benefits or not, is another question. 
The fact is that the absence of competitive pressures and adequate 
information often do not give LDC consumers an unimpaired choice, at 
realistic relative prices. Much of the (we believe quantitatively 
important) misallocation of LDC resources on inappropriate (e.g., 
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overspecified) goods as well as inappropriate technologies is related 
to the presence of proprietary and non-competitive elements in areas 
not warranted by the basic scale relative to the size of the market, 
e.g. in soft drinks and drugs. The evolution of modern appropriate 
goods for local markets, at prices which reflect quality differentials, 
is similar to the adaptive changes in processes arising from "blue 
collar" R &D, practiced on the factory floor and in the machine shops, 
as contrasted to the more visible "white collar" variety carried on in 
corporate and university labs. It is similarly linked to empirical 
learning by doing and experimenting processes. While some scientists, 
some economists, and many engineers may well disdain to call both of 
these related types of activity technology change--and may be especially 
reluctant to admit of any relationship to science--we would argue not 
only that they are important for LDC social and economic growth but 
als·o that they are but one step removed from the mechanical or engineering 
intensive innovations of 19th century labor surplus Japan, and two steps 
from those of the 19th century labor scarce United S*ates. 
It is, in summary, admittedly futile to attempt to manipulate basic 
science in any particular direction; the relationships and feed-backs 
are much too diffuse and complicated. But LDC's can, and we might add, 
must, exercise restraint as to the fields in which they decide to 
maintain a first-rate scientific establishment. They must make 
a serious effort at reorienting their educational structures 
towards the very ability to make these selections, i.e., via the 
achievement of a broadly based scientific literacy which not only 
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conveys the ability to perceive where indigenous frontier capacity 
should be installed but also guarantees the necessary access to the 
international networks. 
With respect to technology, the task of public policy is perhaps 
easier, but by no means simple. Internationally, there exists a 
substantially larger number of borrowing options by country and by 
type than we used to believe, but many remain obscured by a lack of 
information and other institutional impediments, some related to the 
public and private capital transfer mechanism. The options which exist, 
in nature, with respect to indigenous or adaptive technology change, 
new or derived, are much more numerous yet. Govemments can do much 
at the aggregative level to ensure that the veil between relative 
prices and endowments which must sometimes be drawn is neither exces­
sively thick or kept excessively long; governments can help ensure 
that sufficient workable competition exists so that entrepreneurs are 
interested in finding the most appropriate technology in the first 
place, rather than being in a position to indulge their preference 
for prestige and the 'quiet life." And, perhaps .most important, as a 
complement to these aggregative measures is the possible intervention 
of the public sector in institutional areas, in ensuring a freer flow 
of information on market, quality and technology options and in providing 
support to technical education and R & D, especially of the unspectacular 
adaptive non-appropriable type. 
The interactions between science, technology and development are poten­
tially of :very great benefit to the transition effort of the developing 
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country--which typically finds itself more restricted than the rich in 
terms of its ability to rely on the contribution of more physical capital 
and other conventional inputs. But the opportunities of participating 
within an interdependent global system will not be realized if national 
policies are not more realistically geared to our gradually improving 
understanding of the fundamental behavioral relationsnips involved. 
It is hoped that the work of this Symposium has carried us a small 
step forward in this direction. 
